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(JoongAng Ilbo) As 5,000 Crumbled, the “Big Player” National Pension Could Not Even Put Up a Fight (November 9, 2026)

2026.11.08
(JoongAng Ilbo) As 5,000 Crumbled, the “Big Player” National Pension Could Not Even Put Up a Fight (November 9, 2026)

As the KOSPI was pushed below the 5,000 mark intraday on the 6th, the “role of pension funds” debate has again come under scrutiny. When the stock market swung on the U.S.-originated tariff shock early last year, pension funds such as the National Pension bought up domestic stocks in large volumes and served as the market’s “safety valve.” In this downturn, however, they were not strong enough to absorb the massive selling by foreign investors. Critics point out that because the National Pension failed to lower its domestic equity allocation sufficiently, its buying capacity was limited precisely when the stock market plunged.

According to the Korea Exchange on the 8th, while foreign investors made net sales of 2.69 trillion won on the KOSPI market on the 6th, “pension funds and others,” which include the National Pension, made net purchases of only 287 billion won. That is 10.7% of foreign investors’ net sales and 55% of individual investors’ net purchases (521 billion won).

Reporter Kim Young-ok

View original Reporter Kim Young-ok

This stands in contrast to last year, when the KOSPI broke below the 2,500 mark on the U.S.-originated tariff shock. From the day after martial law was declared on December 3, 2024, through April last year, pension funds and others made net purchases of about 8.35 trillion won on the KOSPI market. That amounted to 43.6% of foreign investors’ net sales over the same period and 4.4 times individual investors’ net purchases (1.881 trillion won).

Meanwhile, the financial authorities have decided to temporarily ease, from the 9th, the rules on forced liquidation for investors who bought stocks with borrowed money. The aim is to prevent a vicious circle in which a flood of forced sales triggered by plunging share prices drives prices down further. But the same follow-up measures were taken in 2020 and 2022 as well without much effect. This time, too, there are concerns that the move may instead encourage “debt-financed investing” or enlarge investors’ losses.

The Pension Fund That Grew Its KOSPI Allocation in the Bull Market Has No Ammunition Left to Stop the Slide

Pension funds also stepped in with aggressive buying when the stock market plunged in March 2020 as COVID-19 spread. Their net purchases on the KOSPI market, which had fallen short of 300 billion won over the two months of January and February that year, jumped to about 3 trillion won in March alone. As share prices nosedived on the COVID-19 shock, pension funds sharply increased the scale of their buying and served as a prop for the stock market.

Behind the National Pension’s smaller buying capacity in this plunge than in the past, however, lies its higher domestic equity allocation. Its domestic equity allocation, which at 11.5% at the end of 2024 was below the target at the time (15.4%), rose to 18.1% at the end of last year and to 21.4% at the end of January this year. After that, as rising share prices increased the value of its holdings, it soared to 29.4% at the end of May.

The problem is that, although the National Pension had the opportunity to lower its domestic equity allocation while the market was rising, the weight of policy was placed on holding back sell volumes. Normally, when its domestic equity allocation exceeds the upper end of the permitted range of its strategic asset allocation (SAA), the National Pension sells stocks to adjust the allocation (rebalancing). In January, however, the Fund Management Committee temporarily deferred rebalancing, and in May it went on to raise the domestic equity target allocation from 14.9% to 20.8%. At the same time, it reduced the maximum daily adjustment volume. The aim was to prevent large volumes of shares from flooding the market in a rising market, but as a result, when the plunge came with the domestic equity allocation high, its capacity for further buying was limited.

In fact, on the 15th of last month, when the KOSPI plunged 7.57%, foreign investors made net sales of 3.768 trillion won while pension funds’ net purchases came to only 35 billion won.

“Had it reduced its domestic equity allocation during the upswing, it could have eased market overheating and realized gains while also securing the capacity to buy again when share prices fell,” said Yun Suk-myung, Research Fellow Emeritus at the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA),

pointing out, “The rebalancing principle is a device meant to keep judgment from wavering with market conditions, but by changing it as needed, they have let even the golden opportunity for structural pension reform slip away.”

There are also concerns that the financial authorities’ easing of the forced liquidation rules could weigh on the stock market. According to the Financial Supervisory Service, from the 9th through January 31 next year, securities firms are exempt from the obligation to maintain a collateral ratio of at least 140% on credit loans.

This allows securities firms to lower the collateral ratio or defer forced liquidation even when falling share prices leave collateral values below the standard. Outstanding margin loans, used to buy stocks with borrowed money, stood in the 28 trillion won range as of the 5th, 1.8 times the level at the end of 2024. With the stock market plunging in this situation, the measure is meant to reduce large-scale forced liquidation.

But the same measure was introduced twice before without effect. When the stock market plunged in 2022 on steep U.S. interest rate hikes, the financial authorities waived the collateral ratio rule for three months from July that year.

Yet the average daily amount of forced liquidation related to credit loans and securities-backed loans at the ten major securities firms stayed at a similar level: 17.869 billion won in June, before the easing, and 17.894 billion won in September, after it took effect.

The number of under-collateralized accounts at the five major securities firms also roughly tripled in September of that year, from 5,336 to 15,779. The same measure was implemented during the COVID-19 crash of March 2020, but in that month the amount of forced liquidation and the number of accounts affected hit their highest levels of the year.

Professor Yang Jun-seok of the Department of Economics at the Catholic University of Korea said, “Risky investment should come with commensurate risk, but deferring forced liquidation and lowering the collateral ratio may instead encourage debt-financed investing.”

The industry is not pleased either.

An official at a securities firm said, “It is a structure in which the risk that arises when share prices fall further must ultimately be borne by the securities firms,” adding, “If the downtrend continues, investors may later be subjected to forced liquidation at even lower prices, so their losses could actually grow.”

Reporters Kim Da-young and Park Hyun-ju

https://n.news.naver.com/article/025/0003563697?sid=101

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