(Naeil Shinmun) Interview | Dr. Yun Suk-myung’s Proposed Pension Overhaul: “Shift to a Contribution-Based National Pension and a More Generous Basic Pension” (November 17, 2026)
Proposes redesigning the roles of the National, Basic, and retirement pensions … “Disclose the grounds for the decision to defer rebalancing and the Government Employees Pension financial projections”
Under the 2025 amendment, which raised the National Pension contribution rate and the income replacement rate together, the contribution rate this year is 9.5% and the nominal income replacement rate 43%. The contribution rate rises to 13% by 2033.
The remaining tasks are how to secure the old-age income of people with short contribution periods or who find it hard to pay contributions, and how to divide the cost between generations. Adjusting the National Pension Fund’s allocation to domestic equities and the state’s burden for the Government Employees Pension are also major pending issues. On the 11th, we met Dr. Yun Suk-myung at a café in the Yeouido Post Office in Seoul and asked him about structural reform of Korea’s pensions to secure old-age income and about the principles of fund management.

Yun Suk-myung, Research Fellow Emeritus at the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, is (currently) Leader of the Pension Future Forum / (currently) a member of the steering committee of the Korea Workers’ Compensation and Welfare Service’s SME Retirement Pension (“Blue Seed”) / an advisory committee member of the Special Committee on Pension Reform of the 21st and 22nd National Assemblies / a member of the 1st–5th National Pension Financial Estimation Committees (in charge of fiscal stabilization measures) / (former) President of the Korean Pension Association / (former) Chair of the Basic Old-Age Pension Financial Projection Committee / (former) Vice Chair of the National Pension Deliberation Committee / (former) a member of the Economic, Social and Labor Council’s study group on continued employment in a super-aged society / (former) a member of the Financial Estimation Committees of the Government Employees, Military, and Private School Teachers Pensions. Photo: Lee Eui-jong
●In the last National Pension overhaul, the contribution rate and the income replacement rate were raised together. Do you think it achieved stronger benefit adequacy and fiscal stabilization at the same time?
Raising contributions does have the effect of delaying the point at which the fund is depleted. But if we assume that after depletion each year’s pension payments are covered only by that year’s contributions, the required contribution rate rises as much as the benefit level was raised.
We must look both at how many more years the fund will last and at how much future contributors will have to bear. If the law states that the state guarantees payment, it must also make clear who will bear the funding to keep that promise.
If taxes are injected before the relationship between benefits and burdens is fixed, a structure may become entrenched in which the current and future working generations underwrite with their taxes the benefits of generations that paid low contribution rates in the past.
●You have proposed changing the National Pension to a system in which people “get back as much as they pay in.” What do you mean?
The idea is to convert the contributions paid into present value, reflect investment returns, and calculate the monthly benefit according to life expectancy at the point one begins receiving the pension.
A public system would manage the funds over the long term and pay them out as a pension in old age, but the starting point for calculating benefits would be the contributor’s own contributions. The intent is to entrust the income redistribution function now built into the National Pension benefit formula to a tax-financed old-age income security system.
The previous administration’s proposal to introduce an automatic adjustment mechanism could have deepened intergenerational inequality. The automatic adjustment mechanism to be applied when demographic and economic conditions change should also be designed according to whom it applies to.
There is a method that reflects changes in life expectancy in calculating the benefits of new beneficiaries, and a method that adjusts the size of benefit increases for those already receiving pensions. Both should be considered together, but a minimum guarantee must be designed alongside them so that low-income beneficiaries secure the income they need to live.
● How can the old age of people with short contribution periods or low incomes be secured?
Basic Pension funding should be concentrated more on low-income older people. Rather than cutting current beneficiaries all at once, it should be changed gradually toward paying more generous benefits to those in urgent need of support. When setting eligibility and benefit levels, we should look not only at a fixed share of the older population or at standard median income but at the cost of a minimum standard of living. Separate supplementary measures could also be considered for those who have paid National Pension contributions for a long time on low incomes.
For those who can work longer, it is important to lengthen their contribution periods. If, on the premise of structural reform of the National Pension and labor market reform, we discuss retirement-age extension and the continued employment of older workers together, raise the National Pension’s upper age limit for mandatory coverage by five years, and raise the income ceiling used to calculate contributions and benefits, pension amounts can be increased substantially even at the current accrual rate.
Retirement pensions should be expanded in coverage, and retirement benefits should be received as a pension in old age. If the group that can secure old-age income through the National Pension and retirement pensions widens, the Basic Pension can be concentrated more on those who find it hard to secure sufficient income from those two systems.
● What should we look at in the controversy over rebalancing the National Pension Fund’s domestic equities?
Attention is focused on why the fund did not sell when share prices peaked, but what should be examined first is why the asset allocation principles originally set were changed.
Rebalancing is the procedure for adjusting allocations when actual asset weights have drifted from their targets because of share price movements and the like. A decision to change the target allocation itself and a decision to defer the buying and selling of assets to meet that target each need their own grounds. We must also examine to what extent exchange-rate stabilization or domestic stock market conditions influenced fund management judgments.
If the results of the deferral are judged by returns on a particular date, the conclusion may change when the reference date changes. What matters is how the Fund Management Committee judged the risks of asset concentration and volatility, and which alternatives it weighed in reaching its decision.
It is possible to protect trading information that could affect the market while still disclosing the grounds for decisions and the deliberation process.
If necessary, would it not also be possible to anonymize the speakers?
● By what standard should the Government Employees Pension be reformed?
It is hard to judge which is more favorable by comparing only the monthly benefits of the National Pension and the Government Employees Pension. Contribution periods, the range of income reflected in benefit calculation, the contribution burden on members and employers, retirement allowances, and deficit subsidies all have to be compared together. The contributions the state pays as employer must also be distinguished from the subsidies it injects separately because the system’s contributions and revenue cannot cover benefit spending.
To assess the effects of the 2015 overhaul, we must check how benefits and the fiscal burden change while the transitional provisions for existing employees apply. The long-term financial projections should be disclosed, and there needs to be a discussion of what standards could be applied in common to the National Pension and the Government Employees Pension. In the long term, a common framework for public pensions could be considered.
●How should the discussion of structural reform proceed from here?
Strength should be concentrated in the National Assembly’s Special Committee on Pension Reform. It must deal not only with the National Pension and the Basic Pension but also with retirement pensions and the employment of older workers. These issues span several ministries and standing committees. First of all, the long-term financial projections and their assumptions must be disclosed. Only when the public knows which generation pays how much and receives how much, and how much tax goes in, can the overhaul proposals be discussed.
Reporter Kim Gyu-cheol [email protected]
