(Korea Economic Magazine) [Economic Stroll] Why the Piketty Craze Is No Simple Matter (July 31, 2014)
![(Korea Economic Magazine) [Economic Stroll] Why the Piketty Craze Is No Simple Matter (July 31, 2014)](/uploads/editor/2026/11/492782b4529d418cb3d592aa44b63862-AD.25477562.1.jpg)
(The deepening income polarization that Professor Piketty has shown in British- and American-style countries since 1970
does not look like someone else’s problem. This is because the trickle-down effect of economic growth
has fallen off markedly.)
Yun Suk-myung, Director of the Pension Research Center, Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs
Born in 1961. M.A. in Economics, Korea University, 1988. Ph.D. in Economics, Texas A&M University. Director of Research Coordination, National Pension Research Institute. Adjunct Professor of Economics, Korea University (current). Director of the Pension Research Center, Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, since 2013 (current).
The ripple effects of “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” by Thomas Piketty, professor at the Paris School of Economics, published early this year, are no simple matter. This is because it criticizes mainstream economics for spending considerable energy on building sophisticated models while falling short in its power to explain reality and in the effectiveness of its policy prescriptions. It is also because of Professor Piketty’s research findings, drawn from statistical data compiled over a long span of more than 200 years, that the return on capital is far higher than the return on labor, and that income inequality has deepened considerably since 1970 in British- and American-style countries, which favored smaller government than continental Europe.
Professor Piketty takes a position different from Marx’s “Capital,” which held that “the bourgeoisie digs its own grave”—that is, that rapid capital accumulation would lower the return on capital and ultimately bring about the downfall of the capitalists. His analysis of the past several hundred years finds it hard to identify factors that would lower the importance of capital or the return on capital. This is because non-human capital, represented by industrial, real estate, and financial capital, has grown as rapidly as total labor income based on human capital.
Professor Piketty’s interpretation is that this result arose because, in the process of economic growth, not only human factors but also capital, a non-human factor, mattered. He argues that, thanks to continuous productivity growth and the diffusion of knowledge, capital accumulation was able to remain in balance throughout the process of economic growth up to the present day. As a result, the importance of capital has not weakened even from a macroeconomic perspective. He also sends the message that big government is effective in eliminating or easing income inequality. Further, he believes that the Western European-style welfare state can be maintained in the 21st century through supplementation rather than dismantling. This argument is, of course, premised on securing transparency in the running of the state. His position is that income inequality merely fell out of focus during the long systemic competition between capitalism and communism after the Russian Revolution, and that it is bound to attract attention again.
The debate over whether Professor Piketty’s findings are right or wrong is of little significance.
The point is why such findings have become the object of worldwide attention at this particular moment.
Korea, too, has long debated whether growth or distribution should come first. Economic growth was emphasized because of the belief that everyone in society would prosper through the trickle-down effect of growth. Because a considerable number of people agreed with this hypothesis, growth-oriented policies could be sustained. But for Korea, which runs a social system closer to the Anglo-American model than to the European one, the problem of income polarization that Professor Piketty showed deepening in Anglo-American countries since 1970 does not feel like someone else’s problem. This is because the trickle-down effect of economic growth has fallen off markedly.
Given our reality, with a social system closer to the Anglo-American than to the European model, it is time to wrestle hard with how to build income distribution and social security. Part of the reason is that being swept along by the populism rampant at every election is more likely to deepen distortions than to solve problems. If it is difficult to pay 45–50% of total income in taxes as the Nordic countries do, it seems time to devote all our efforts to working out what level of burden would meet our citizens’ expectations and what income redistribution policies to build on that basis. That is why an approach that steps back from the partisan logic that has dominated our society seems necessary.
It is time to find a “Korean Way” that comprehensively takes into account demographic change, the capacity to bear taxes, and public perceptions.
