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Pension Future Forum

(KBS 1TV, Sunday Diagnosis) [Sunday Diagnosis Live] The Era of Low Fertility and Population Aging — How Should We Respond? Posted January 1, 2023 (8:22 a.m.)

2026.11.16

■ Host: Cho Hyun-jin
■ Panel: Na Kyung-won, Vice Chair of the Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy, Ambassador for Climate and Environment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and former Floor Leader of the Liberty Korea Party; Yun Suk-myung, Chief Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, Advisory Committee Member of the National Assembly Special Committee on Pension Reform, and former President of the Korean Pension Association; Park Sang-joon, Professor at the Faculty of International Research and Education, Waseda University, and former Chief Researcher at the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade

Cho Hyun-jin: Good morning, everyone. The morning of the first day of 2023, the Year of the Black Rabbit, has dawned. To mark the new year, Sunday Diagnosis Live will spend the next two weeks tackling the biggest challenges facing our society. The first topic we will take up today is low fertility, population aging, and pension reform. Low fertility and population aging have become serious enough to threaten the very existence of our society. And the pension problem that is directly linked to them. We have invited the country’s top experts to diagnose them in detail. Let us watch a related video and then go straight to the discussion.
(VCR playback)
Cho Hyun-jin: Let me introduce the three panelists joining us on this first morning of 2023. First, we have Na Kyung-won, Vice Chair of the Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy. Happy New Year.

Na Kyung-won: Happy New Year.

Cho Hyun-jin: He is a pension expert. He served as President of the Korean Pension Association and is a Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, correct? We have Research Fellow Yun Suk-myung. Hello.

Yun Suk-myung: Hello. Happy New Year.

Cho Hyun-jin: Happy New Year to you too. Lastly, an expert on the economies and societies of Korea and Japan. We have Professor Park Sang-joon of the Faculty of International Research and Education at Waseda University in Japan. Thank you for joining us.

Park Sang-joon: Hello.

Cho Hyun-jin: We have heard so much about low fertility and population aging that one wonders whether we have become somewhat numb to it. Yet one cannot help keenly feeling what a truly serious problem it is. The world’s population has passed 8 billion, while Korea’s population keeps shrinking. Let us first diagnose just how serious the current situation is. Vice Chair.

Na Kyung-won: First, I thank KBS for choosing low fertility and population aging as the first topic of Sunday Diagnosis. Everyone says this problem is serious, but only when we actually feel how serious it is can society move together. In that sense, because society must solve it together, I want to thank KBS for choosing this topic. As you know, the Republic of Korea is the only country in the world with a total fertility rate below 1. The total fertility rate is how many children two people have over their lifetime. We are below 1, and we now believe that last year, 2022, it even fell below 0.8. Through 2021 it was 0.81. So we have actually reached a very serious situation, and if we look at how much our population structure changes as a result, in 2025 we enter a super-aged society at 20%. People aged 65 and over will be 20% of the population, and by 2035 one in three will be 65 or older. In a word, this ultimately turns the Republic of Korea into a shrinking society. According to a recent Goldman Sachs global report, by 2050 the Korean economy will be smaller than those of Egypt, Indonesia, and Nigeria, and by 2075 smaller even than that of the Philippines. What is the cause? The working-age population shrinks because of low fertility and population aging. So the problem is not simply that the fertility rate is low and fewer children are born; it is that, as the population structure changes, the population we must support grows relative to the working-age population. The problem, then, is that the Republic of Korea would not be sustainable. So our Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy, which until now had in a sense focused only on raising the fertility rate and on population aging, has decided that we must now examine and prepare across all the areas affected by the change in the population structure, starting with education and then defense, industry, and welfare, and that, in addition to raising the fertility rate, we will consider various ways to expand the working-age population.

Cho Hyun-jin: I see. Professor Park, Japan actually went through low fertility and population aging before we did. Looking at the current situation, ours turns out to be far more serious. Please compare us with Japan.

Park Sang-joon: Japan’s situation is serious too. Because it started earlier, there are aspects that improved afterward, but precisely because it started earlier, Japan’s situation is not good either. Still, the fertility rate went up to 1.15 and then rose to nearly 1.5. Although it is falling again now.

Cho Hyun-jin: So Japan never fell below 1 either, the total fertility rate?

Park Sang-joon: Yes, that is right. Even at its very worst it was around 1.26 or 1.27.

Cho Hyun-jin: So Japan has at least held somewhat above 1. Whereas we are said to be falling to 0.7 this year.

Park Sang-joon: But Japan also entered an aged society more than 20 years earlier than we did, and it entered a super-aged society much earlier than we did as well. So since we are only now said to be entering a super-aged society, in a way, if we act quickly now, we could do better than Japan.

Cho Hyun-jin: People often talk about Japan’s lost 20 years, or its lost 30 years. Should we see this as related to the population structure as well?

Park Sang-joon: Of course. Japan’s long-term low growth has been studied extensively, and economists now see its biggest cause as the change in the population structure. That is, if you look at the growth of Japan’s per capita GDP using only the working-age population, those aged 15 to 64, Japan does not look so bad. But if you divide it by the total population, then it becomes long-term low growth.

Cho Hyun-jin: So the population problem is ultimately at the core. Committee Member Yun, when the population structure changes like this, into an aged society with fewer young people and more older people, what kind of society does it become? Can we predict it?

Yun Suk-myung: To put it simply in a few points: Vice Chair Na Kyung-won explained it well earlier, but because we have gone through ultra-low fertility for the past 20 years, even if the birth rate rebounded sharply starting this year, which is unlikely, more than 8 million economically active people who should have been born over those 20 years were not born, so that workforce has vanished into history. So many experts and the economic ministries say that, to solve this problem, we should perhaps accept immigrants from abroad. But if you look at the situation in France, accepting immigrants solved things in the short term at the time, but in the long run, by the second and third generations of immigrants, society has in some respects become turbulent because of cultural clashes. In that respect, it can be seen as politically and socially not a simple matter. And one more thing: my main field is pensions, and there is a very important implication for pension reform. In a democratic society that makes decisions by vote, the median age matters a great deal, in the sense of the median voter.

Cho Hyun-jin: That is the age of the person in the middle when you line up the population from the youngest to the oldest, right?

Yun Suk-myung: The reason the median age matters more than the average is this: for example, when a pension system in which people pay little and receive a lot has been expanded far beyond a normal level, then as the median age rises there is a political temptation to expand that system further. Because people who are not far from retirement can receive a lot after retiring while bearing little in contributions. If we compare the median age of the EU member states, as recently published, with ours, the EU’s median age rises only about 5 or 6 years between 2019 and 2070, from 42 to about 48. But ours rises by more than 18 years between 2022 and 2070, from 48 to nearly 62.4.

Cho Hyun-jin: So you mean the age in the middle will go above 60?

Yun Suk-myung: It will go above that. Now, the National Pension eligibility age was 62 through last year, and from this year it is extended by one year to 63. If the median age is the very age at which people are now receiving the pension, who would support pension reform? On top of that, the important thing is what our total fertility rate of 0.84 last year means: 260,000 births. The preceding generations these cohorts must support are the first baby-boom generation, born between ’55 and ’63, with more than 700,000 born each year, and the second baby-boom generation of the 1970s, with a million born a year. Two hundred sixty thousand must support a million, which is very hard economically, but in a democratic society that makes decisions by majority rule, 260,000 cannot outweigh a million in decision-making. So unless we treat the population problem in a timely way as an urgent and very grave situation, it carries the implication that our society could even go down the path of mutual destruction and catastrophe.

Cho Hyun-jin: As you just said, I belong to the second baby-boom generation, and back then a million of us were born each year, but this year only 250,000 are expected to be born, right? It has shrunk to a quarter. Yet I remember that we had birth-control policies until around the 1990s. The population structure lies in plain view: how it will turn out. So why did policy go so wrong?

Na Kyung-won: Honestly, it is truly incomprehensible that our low-fertility policies, our fertility-related policies, went so wrong. I think policy failure played a very large part in the Republic of Korea becoming an ultra-low-fertility country. If you look through population statistics, the most important fertility figure demographically is 2.1, a total fertility rate of 2.1.

Cho Hyun-jin: At 2.1 the population is maintained, right?

Na Kyung-won: That is the rate at which the population is maintained. But our total fertility rate already reached 2.1 in 1983. At that point we should have asked whether it was right to keep population policy as a birth-control policy, but until then the population had been exploding. Yet we kept that policy, “Have just one and raise it well,” until ’96. So in 2001 we hit a total fertility rate of 1.3, which is classified as ultra-low fertility. In a word, a very wrong policy. It was like that in our 1960s. Our total fertility rate back then was 4.5. Since people had 4.5 children, the slogan was “If you keep having children without thinking, you will not escape beggary.” From then until ’96, for nearly 40 years, the idea that having fewer children is a virtue was lodged so strongly in our minds that it formed a kind of social culture, and I think that is still having an effect today. So, as I keep saying, we must make good policies and also all the other related policies responding to the change in the population structure, but the most important thing, I think, is a change in social culture.

Cho Hyun-jin: Professor Park, how do you see it? Where do you think the causes of low fertility lie?

Park Sang-joon: Low fertility will have various causes. I think that now, in Japan’s case, they understand them quite well. First of all, low fertility is related to the economy. People have fewer children when incomes are poor, and with income polarization, children have now become a luxury good. It is the same in Japan and in Korea: if you divide incomes into lower, middle, and upper groups, the lower you go, the fewer the births. The number of households with children declines, and if you look over time, births fall more steeply the lower you go. That is, births fell among people with income too, but only slightly, while at the lower end they fell sharply.

Cho Hyun-jin: But we have become far better off than 20 or 30 years ago. Yet, in inverse proportion, the fertility rate is falling.

Park Sang-joon: That is because children have become a luxury good. In the past children were a necessity: people simply had children and of course raised them, but later whether to have children or not became a choice. In particular, as women’s educational attainment rose, as women entered the workforce, and as they rejected gender discrimination, from then on women came to fear career interruptions very much. Once that happened, women came to regard it as a choice, so the thinking of our generation in the old days and the thinking of the current generation are very different.

Na Kyung-won: May I add a little? I think much as the professor does. In the past a child was an investment, whereas now I think a child has become a cost. And as population aging proceeds, if preparations for an aged society are not properly made, then I spent money raising my child, but in practice, because of the introduction of the welfare system, that child ends up supporting all the other parents as well. So whereas in the past my child supported me, now, with the introduction of the welfare system, my child supports other people too, and investment has turned into the concept of cost. If I spend money raising a child when I am young, the reward for the money I spent is, in a word, shared with other parents as well. So investment became cost. And another thing: there is something called cohort theory. It holds that if people feel the times the next generation will live through will be harder than those of the generation I lived in, the times I lived in as a child, they do not have children. They say animals behave similarly when the environment deteriorates. And when we survey now, there is a survey of the share of people who think they will live better than their parents’ generation, and even in 2021, 60% predict they will be worse off. So partly because people feel anxious about the future, they also do not have children.

Cho Hyun-jin: We have become better off, but anxiety about the future has grown, and that may have had an effect.

Na Kyung-won: Korean society actually seems very pessimistic about the future. A Gallup International survey released just the other day looked at pessimism and optimism for the new year 2023, whether the Republic of Korea will get better or worse, and on pessimism we came second from the bottom among the world’s countries. That is how widespread pessimism is. I believe these various social moods in turn lower the fertility rate.

Cho Hyun-jin: Professor Park, you said that in Japan’s case the diagnosis you described earlier was reached: that economic problems loom large. Then what policies did Japan pursue to address them?

Park Sang-joon: Well, low fertility and population aging can be seen as something like diabetes.

Cho Hyun-jin: Diabetes?

Park Sang-joon: Yes. With diabetes, if it is severe, you can use medication. You can use insulin. But diabetes fundamentally requires changing your diet and then exercising. However much medication you use, if you do not exercise and are not careful about what you eat, it does no good against diabetes. And if you just sit still, at some point complications set in, and then it gets out of control. And as for the fundamentals, diet, what you eat, and exercise, what Japan, for example, has now come to realize is that housing is unstable, and then employment is unstable, and

Cho Hyun-jin: Housing and employment.

Park Sang-joon: Yes. Housing and employment. And then, as the Vice Chair just mentioned about the future, anxiety about old age. That is anxiety about pensions. As low fertility and population aging progress and people are told pensions are insecure, people feel more anxious about the future, and feeling anxious about the future in turn leads to low fertility; that is how it is seen.

Cho Hyun-jin: It becomes a vicious circle.

Park Sang-joon: And I mentioned career interruptions earlier; women worry a great deal about career interruptions. For example, long working hours: Korea is known for very long working hours in the OECD, and Japan’s working hours were also longer than the OECD average. Long working hours, too, lead women to avoid marriage and not to have children. For example, even if the woman does not work long hours, even when only the man works, if the man works long hours he cannot take part in childcare and housework. Then highly educated women cannot bear it, because they would have to become full-time housewives to that extent. So long working hours are a problem too, things like that. So measures to prevent women’s career interruptions, and long working hours, job insecurity, and housing insecurity: Japan had these too. And in Korea’s case these are clearly problems we have now. And if you ask young people, “Why are you not getting married?” most say they have no money to raise children, that education costs too much. And “I do not even have my own home, but to marry and have a child you need a home.” And “I do not know what will happen to my job right now.” And “my old age”; as you said earlier, the era in which my children support me is over. So young people now say it is because of things like “I do not even know what will become of my old age.” Various policies are important, and giving a lump sum or paying child-rearing allowances is important too, but fundamentally I think we must consider and fix the structural problems our society has. In Japan’s case there are low-fertility and population-aging measures. Whenever there is an agenda, what comes out most prominently on it is these things: how to prevent women’s career interruptions. And many people have said that Japan, compared with Korea, gives women very low status, and in fact there is a lot of truth to that. But if you look at women’s employment rate now, Japan’s female employment rate is higher in almost every age group except 70 and over.

Cho Hyun-jin: Higher than Korea’s?

Park Sang-joon: Yes. And what clearly shows women’s career interruptions is this: in the late 20s, the employment rates of women and men are nearly the same, and in Korea’s case women’s is actually higher. Because men have military service and such, women’s employment rate is very high in the late 20s, but in the late 30s it drops sharply. Then in the late 40s it recovers again. This is called the M-curve, and countries showing the M-curve have women’s career interruptions, since it falls in the late 30s. And countries showing the M-curve have low fertility rates, as Europe’s case also shows. And when the M-curve disappears, the fertility rate recovers.

Cho Hyun-jin: By the M-curve, do you mean that women of childbearing age become insecure precisely at that time?

Park Sang-joon: Yes, that is right. In societies with career interruptions at that time, women avoid having children and avoid marriage in order to escape career interruptions.

Cho Hyun-jin: Then it seems we can pin down the keyword “anxiety”: anxiety about housing, anxiety about employment, anxiety about preparing for old age. I think this is ultimately what makes people reluctant to marry or have children. In fact, since 2006 we have drawn up Basic Plans for Low Fertility and Aging Society and carried them out for 15 years, and the money put in is said to be 380 trillion won. Yet the situation keeps getting worse, and we are recording low fertility, ultra-low fertility, unprecedented anywhere in the world. Why have these policies had no effect at all, Vice Chair?

Na Kyung-won: First, I think the demand side and the supply side, the demanders and suppliers of policy, did not match. The suppliers failed to give what the demanders wanted. People do not have children just because you tell them, “Have children, have children.” And in fact, looking at the amount of budget put in, a lot of it was inflated budget not really needed for overcoming low fertility and population aging. Because budget items related to low fertility and population aging are easy to get funded, each ministry did that a lot even with unrelated items. In the OECD there is a category called family support spending. Family support spending is spending on infertility, childcare, and child-rearing. Our family support spending is 1% lower than the OECD average. So the fact that a lot was put into the low-fertility budget means that a lot of spending was classified as such. So from now on, how will we change policy? On the 28th, together with the population TF, we, with our committee, the Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy, at the center, announced six core tasks in four areas. As I said earlier, we will now focus not only on raising the fertility rate but on responding to the change in the population structure, so the first area is expanding the economically active population. Second, the Republic of Korea’s population becoming a shrinking society: in 2021 our population hit a dead cross. In a word, the number of deaths exceeds the number of births. So since the population is starting to decline, we have no choice but to become a shrinking society, and how do we adapt to a shrinking society? Third is preparing for population aging, and fourth is measures against low fertility. One of the six core tasks is easing the M-curve you just mentioned. Allowing work and family to go together in childbirth and child-rearing: this is not about making it possible only for women; it must be made possible for men as well. Yesterday I saw that an interesting interview by Michelle Obama made the news. She talked about her frustration back then, saying that for about ten years after she and President Obama married and had children, while she struggled with raising the children and keeping her career, President Obama went out and built his political career to his heart’s content, and I could relate to some of that. But in the end, is that not the part that matters most for women? So in practice we have had various systems over the years: maternity leave, parental leave, and so on, but they could not be properly used. Parental leave in particular differs by industry, by company size, and by gender. So the government will actively expand the reduced-working-hours system, including reduced working hours during the childbirth and child-rearing period, and, in a word, we are preparing and will announce various systems to change a culture in which childbirth and child-rearing count as demerits into one in which they count as merits.

Cho Hyun-jin: Let us come back to that issue a little later. Before that, one of the changes this year is that when you have a baby you get 700,000 won a month, then 350,000 won when the child turns one, and the amounts will keep increasing. Do you think such cash-payment policies will help raise the fertility rate, Committee Member?

Yun Suk-myung: I have not looked into that area very closely, but speaking from common sense, as the two of you have already said, the reason our birth rate is falling is that there are aspects such as career interruptions, and then, as was also said earlier, in the past having a child was a kind of investment. It had the character of collateral for one’s old age, collateral for old-age security, but

Cho Hyun-jin: Though parents would not have thought of it so directly.

Yun Suk-myung: The traditional system of private support carries that kind of meaning, but

Cho Hyun-jin: They did expect to be supported, though, right?

Yun Suk-myung: But in our society now, and you mentioned the economic side a lot earlier, many people are saying these days that today’s generation is the first to be worse off than its parents.

Cho Hyun-jin: It has become more likely to turn out that way.

Yun Suk-myung: It is actually materializing in part, and the prospect that more and more generations will be worse off than their parents seems to carry many implications. Because I myself am now anxious about my own retirement preparations. They say the pension fund will be depleted at such-and-such a time, so I wonder whether I will get anything even though I pay contributions, and on top of that, how much does it cost to raise children in our country? There is anxiety that even after raising them, one cannot tell whether they will live better lives than we did socially, so these things seem very complex. On top of that, as many have said, on the investment aspect mentioned earlier, in economic terms, because many women and men have many other alternatives, quite a few young people seem to think, from the standpoint of opportunity cost, that setting their own life paths in other ways may be better than having and raising children. I have talked at length, but from that perspective, astronomical sums are going in. The parental benefit of 700,000 won, and for child-rearing costs, not only the central government but local governments too are offering a great deal: “Come to our region and we will give you this much more in support.” Some even offer sums of 100 million won or more. But I think such measures have limits in pushing the birth rate above trend, upward, in a trend sense. As you said earlier, overall there is great concern that raising children incurs very large social costs, and while that concern cannot be dispelled entirely, social efforts to ease it must be added along with economic ones; only when these go hand in hand can we, well, already last year a terrible 260,000 were born, and this year, as Vice Chair Na also said, it may be 250,000 or fall even further, and in that situation, quickly turning this trend upward seems almost impossible now. To at least slow the decline and turn it into a gentle upward trend, economic measures alone have many problems, and I think our society must make a joint effort to change social conditions.

Na Kyung-won: There is a saying: money does not make people decide to have children, but the fertility rate has never been raised without money. So thinking that people will have children because you gave them some money may be a delusion, but still, a certain amount of such payments helps pull the fertility rate up. As you said earlier, when I look at low-fertility and aging-society measures, I find that structural reform of the whole society is needed. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has now said it will carry out labor reform, education reform, and pension reform this year even if they are unpopular. I think this is the very shortcut to solving the problems of low fertility and an aging society. As you know, labor reform must secure labor flexibility in order to dispel many of the concerns of women facing career interruptions, in matters such as reduced working hours. And for older people, there are aspects of the retirement age of 60 that we must reconsider. So issues such as continued employment and reemployment. These are all labor reform. And another thing: when you ask people why they do not have children, men answer, first, housing and, second, education costs, while women answer, first, self-fulfillment and, second, education. So through education reform, reduce the burden of private education costs. And through education reform, also resolve children’s care issues to some extent. This is needed as another pillar. And pension reform too: how to make it strengthen stability in the face of population aging and old-age security. So in fact these three reforms are directly linked to solving the problems of low fertility and population aging. So I think giving cash is necessary. Why? As I said, people do not decide to have children because of it, but in particular, the parental benefit was recently raised to 700,000 won a month and will rise to 1 million won next year. The reason is none other than that this is the period right after childbirth, when many women quit or go on parental leave and their income actually falls. So it is very meaningful as a certain economic compensation during the child-rearing period. And it also allows parents to choose more diverse forms of child-rearing, including home care. So I think the parental benefit will play a positive role. But I do not think the fertility rate will rise from that alone.

Cho Hyun-jin: As you mentioned, looking at the measures that came out of the vice-ministerial meeting of the ministries concerned on population future strategy on the 28th of last month, right? They raise the age limit for reduced working hours from children aged 8 to 12, right? They extend parental leave from 12 months to 18 months, and they will attract highly skilled foreign workers. In other words, they will more actively accept immigrants. There seems to be a lot of interest in this immigration issue. So ultimately, the idea is to make up for the population decline to some extent through immigration? Is that realistic? What do you think?

Na Kyung-won: Well, I think the time has now come for us to look into a more systematic immigration policy. Of course, I agree with what was said earlier, that immigration does not provide a fundamental solution. And I know there is research showing that after immigration, even foreigners from countries with high fertility rates eventually become our citizens and show fertility patterns similar to ours. But we have actually been very negative about immigration. There was no country as closed as ours, but

Cho Hyun-jin: We were rather exclusionary.

Na Kyung-won: There is real demand too, and in fact raising the fertility rate alone cannot sharply increase the working-age population. In particular, one of the things I have been looking at very closely on low fertility these days is that with those born in the 2000s, we face yet another population cliff. The generation born in the 1990s, who are now becoming parents, came from a time when 600,000 were born each year. But from the 2000s, births fall to 400,000 a year. So 200,000 drop off abruptly. So I think that only if we open up this immigration policy as well can our efforts to raise the fertility rate have an effect.

Cho Hyun-jin: Professor Park, in Japan’s case, was immigration policy pursued in connection with low fertility?

Park Sang-joon: Not so much low fertility as the labor force shrinking as a result of low fertility. And the pension problem becoming more serious too, since there are fewer young people. In Japan’s case they almost always changed things only when driven into a corner at the last moment, and in the past public opinion in Japan was also very negative about immigration. There was even talk like, “We would rather sink gracefully.” But in the end there was nothing else to be done. They kept reforming pensions, reforming again and again, yet even as they reformed, the future outlook kept getting worse, so for about the last ten years they have been very proactive about immigration. And here, a point Korea can learn from: in Korea people still associate immigration with 3D jobs and the like.

Cho Hyun-jin: Right.

Park Sang-joon: But that ultimately means using immigration to keep Korea’s marginal firms alive. And because of that, problems such as illegal entrants keep arising. But if you look at many advanced countries, the system for immigration in advanced countries, and it is the same in Japan, is about attracting highly skilled workers. So when Japan began actively attracting immigrants, it introduced a points system that gives points to those applying to immigrate, to those applying to enter Japan before immigrating, so that applicants can also know what their score is. The higher the score, the greater the chance of entry and the chance to immigrate to Japan; it shifted mainly toward attracting highly skilled workers, and I think that is necessary. Setting aside whether immigration is good or bad, Korea too now needs labor because the pension problem is so serious. Since it has become unavoidable, how will we handle this immigration? That, I think, is what matters. Not whether to do it or not; we have to accept immigrants, and what matters is how we do it when we accept them. Relatedly, the labor force is now becoming severely short, which is also a problem, and as for skilled workers, just because skilled workers are lacking now, you cannot hand jobs to people who are not adequately trained. So companies say they are short of workers, while young people say they cannot find jobs, so how to train and attract skilled workers will be important, and as for labor reform, I agree 100% with what the Vice Chair said earlier: labor reform and education reform are ultimately low-fertility measures. In labor reform too, for example, there is now a labor shortage. So extend the retirement age and let those people work, or extend the retirement age because pensions are insufficient. But the moment people in their 20s and 30s hear that the retirement age will be extended or that immigrants will be accepted, they object. Because then the harm will fall on them.

Cho Hyun-jin: Right.

Park Sang-joon: In other words, there are no jobs. Because there are no jobs, they are completely stuck, so how will we increase jobs? This too is a very important point in labor reform: how to increase jobs. In Japan’s case, as one way to increase jobs, as long as regular employment is maintained, it does not matter if the share of nonregular workers rises. You mentioned labor flexibility earlier, but when regular workers go from 1 million to 1.1 million, even if nonregular workers go from 1 million to 1.6 million, regular jobs are still protected. And those who want to work get to work. So for women returning after career interruptions, and for men and women past the retirement age, you keep creating jobs for them, even nonregular or contract positions. And to do this, working hours have to come down. Even now the topic of the day is that, since one person works up to 10 hours, when people are needed, it would be good if this person worked 15 or 16 hours; that is how it is discussed, but in the long run this should be changed into hiring two people. Then wages cannot go up, of course. So labor unions too must keep moving toward maintaining and expanding employment rather than raising wages; only then can we solve the labor force problems ahead and the pension problem as well, I think.

Na Kyung-won: On the direction of labor reform in that area, I think there is an aspect of our population structure we must look at closely. In the past there could be backlash such as, “If we extend the retirement age, continue employment, and people over 60 get jobs, will young people’s jobs not disappear?” But as I said, we have a third population cliff. That is, from those born in the 2000s on, the population effectively falls by 200,000, to 400,000. A decrease of 200,000 is an enormous number. In effect from 600,000 to 400,000. The population shrinks to two-thirds; it is cut down to two-thirds, so if we slowly prepare the retirement-age extension issue, the issue of older-worker employment, until the 2030s, when those born in the 2000s are actively working in society, it will not take jobs from young people but will in effect increase our working-age population. So we must look very closely at the population structure as we discuss all the reforms together. In the past we too thought that way a lot: that giving older people jobs and extending the retirement age would take jobs from young people. But now we no longer need to see it that way. If we do it gradually from now on, it will by no means take jobs from young people, I believe.

Cho Hyun-jin: We have mostly talked about low fertility, but on population aging: right now about one in six people is 65 or older.

Na Kyung-won: In ’25, one in five.

Cho Hyun-jin: In ’25, one in five will be 25 or older, an older person, legally. And looking at Statistics Korea’s 2021 life tables, a 60-year-old Korean man will live another 23.5 years and a woman another 28.4 years. So after retiring one has to live more than 20 years; can we really sustain this? Should we not shift to a social system in which people work longer and pay taxes longer? Such ideas keep coming up. But then what comes up is: if older people keep working, they will take all the jobs, so what jobs are young people supposed to get? How can these coexist?

Yun Suk-myung: I think there is a solution if we discuss this truly, completely openly, laying it all out. You mentioned life expectancy earlier, but what matters is something called the modal age at death. The same cohort. For example, among people born in 1970, how long they live on average matters, but so does the age at which the largest number of that cohort die. That is the modal age at death, and for Japanese women it already passed 90 in 2000. And when we too make long-term National Pension projections, women are expected to pass 90 easily. The age at which the largest number die passes 90. And as you well know, a new term, “Hundred,” was coined, was it not? What the era of 100-year lives means is that our modern ancestors are Homo sapiens, and a new humanity different from Homo sapiens has been born. So it is called Homo Hundred, and what is very frustrating for us is that people come out of their main jobs at good large companies before even reaching 50, and after that they do very physically demanding work, yet while it is physically very demanding the pay level drops sharply, so the problem of elderly poverty is very serious, is it not?

Cho Hyun-jin: Right.

Yun Suk-myung: A few years ago we raised the retirement age from 55 to 60. But because it was raised without preparation, only those at good workplaces, civil servants and public institutions, benefited, so, especially where competition for good jobs is fierce, there is very strong social pressure against extending the retirement age. But the solution to this problem may be easier than one might think. Professor Park mentioned the Japanese earlier, and Japan has what is called post-retirement reemployment, under which some 70 to 80% or more of older people work after the retirement age. But in exchange, under post-retirement reemployment, they receive a monthly wage of at least 30% to 50 or 60%. Well, Korea still has seniority-based pay, does it not? Although a wage peak system is said to exist. So post-retirement reemployment. In the current situation, an across-the-board extension of the retirement age is difficult. That is, from 60 to 65. But many members of our society
approach this from the standpoint of whether to extend the retirement age or not, but in 10 or 20 years our population problem will bring a point at which this retirement-age issue can be resolved naturally. Until then, until then, through the form of post-retirement reemployment, those who wish can keep working, and if they receive between 30% and 60% of their wage at retirement, there is room to hire two young people. Then there is concern that those whose wages fall sharply even though they keep working will not accept this, but various options can be offered there. If working hours are reduced while wages fall, and the state covers a substantial portion of the four major social insurance contributions, including the National Pension, then workers themselves see lower wages but also lower contributions, and employers hiring older workers pay lower wages with a lighter social insurance burden, so there is room for mutual consensus. This is the direction we should go, and the OECD too talks about active aging, about gradual retirement in relation to an active old age, and if we go this way, for the next ten years or so we can lengthen National Pension contribution periods, people can secure more earned income, and it can also help solve young people’s employment cliff. And what is important is that the jobs where competition with young people is fierce are those I mentioned, civil servants, public institutions, and large companies, while in a considerable number of other jobs there is not much job competition between young and older people. In that sense, I think that if we pursue very well-targeted policies, this problem can be solved better than one might think.

Cho Hyun-jin: The more I hear, the more I feel that low fertility and population aging are all connected to housing, employment, labor, and anxiety about old-age preparation. We will take up labor issues intensively again next week.

https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/mobile/view/view.do?ncd=6325338

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