(Dong-A Ilbo) [Dong-A Debate] Raising the National Pension Income Replacement Rate (April 17, 2015)

《Minister of Health and Welfare Moon Hyung-pyo recently indicated his intention to pursue National Pension reform once the reform of the Government Employees Pension is concluded. At the same time, calls have emerged for raising the National Pension’s income replacement rate. The income replacement rate is the ratio of pension benefits to lifetime average earnings and is scheduled to be lowered in stages to 40% by 2028. Proponents of raising the income replacement rate say that, with early retirement shortening contribution periods, people sneer that the pension amounts to little more than pocket money, and they argue that the income replacement rate should be raised even if it means raising contributions. Opponents counter that Korea’s income replacement rate is not low even by comparison with advanced countries and that, under a one-pension-per-person framework, it is an adequate level. We present the views of two experts.》
▼ Is a Pension That Falls Below the Minimum Cost of Living Normal? ▼

Kim Yeon-myeong, Professor, Department of Social Welfare, Chung-Ang University
In Favor: The National Pension may suffice as “pocket money,” but it is far too low to cover living expenses. In nominal terms, the pension is 40% of the insured’s own average earnings, but this figure presupposes forty years of contributions. Given the worsening trends of late entry into the labor market and early retirement, forty years of contributions is impossible. The average contribution period is, at a generous estimate, about twenty-five years, in which case the pension comes to not 40% but 25%.
At current benchmarks, a person whose lifetime average monthly earnings are about 2 million won and who has contributed to the National Pension for twenty-five years would receive a pension of roughly 500,000 won. That falls short even of the 2015 minimum cost of living for a single-person household, 620,000 won. The reality is that a person earning the most average wage pays contributions for a lifetime and still receives a pension below the minimum cost of living. The National Pension was created so that people could live out their old age while maintaining a minimum of dignity, yet far from a minimum of dignity, they are lucky if they are not struggling in poverty. This is the most fundamental reason why the National Pension must be raised substantially.
Public distrust of the National Pension is the biggest obstacle to running the pension system. In the past, misconceptions about fund depletion caused the greatest distrust. But as the cases of advanced countries that pay pensions perfectly well without a fund have become known, the misconceptions about fund depletion have largely been cleared up. Recently, the real cause of distrust in the National Pension appears to be the miserably low level of the pension. Because the pension amounts to little more than pocket money even after decades of contributions, people distrust the National Pension and resent paying contributions. Many surveys find that people would willingly pay additional contributions if a proper pension were paid. This is the second fundamental reason why National Pension benefits must be raised substantially.
Raising National Pension benefits requires pursuing two tasks at once: raising the income replacement rate and closing the coverage gaps of people who will not receive the National Pension. Raising the income replacement rate raises the pension amount. But because it is bound to be linked to higher contributions over the medium to long term, it could make it harder for wage workers and small self-employed people to pay contributions and further entrench the coverage gaps. Conversely, if the focus is placed on closing the coverage gaps by strengthening the contribution credit system (pension credits) without re-raising the income replacement rate, which is set to fall to 40% by 2028, the pensions of vulnerable groups can be raised somewhat. But it would be difficult to create a National Pension at the adequate level the middle class wants. National Pension reform must meet two goals at once: adequate old-age income security for the middle class and a minimum income guarantee for vulnerable groups. Raising the income replacement rate and expanding pension credits are therefore not an either-or choice in National Pension reform but tasks to be pursued simultaneously.
Making National Pension benefits realistic requires considering the financing at the same time. Raising the income replacement rate must be discussed together with raising contributions. Contributions at a level of only 4.5% at present cannot guarantee an adequate pension. To create a National Pension with adequate contributions and adequate benefits that can take some responsibility for the old age of the middle class, raising contributions is unavoidable. This discussion must begin in earnest. A gradual, sequential approach is needed, however, taking into account the effect on the coverage gaps and the public’s ability to pay. The funding to extend the contribution periods of vulnerable groups and to fill the gaps in contributions caused by public-interest activities such as childbirth and military service must be borne by the national treasury. In every country, pension credits are financed from the national treasury. They are currently financed from the National Pension Fund, but the financing of credits needs a thorough review.
Every system has a purpose for which it was created. The National Pension was created to guarantee a minimally dignified life in old age, and no value can be more important than that. Over the past twenty years, the world has competed zealously to cut public pensions. Recently, reflection on the aftereffects of excessive pension cuts has made pension adequacy a new issue. Korea’s cut to National Pension benefits was harsh to a degree almost unprecedented anywhere in the world. The country as a whole suffers serious old-age poverty now and will continue to do so. It is now time to reflect on the past and pool society’s wisdom on how to strengthen the functions of the National Pension.
Kim Yeon-myeong, Professor, Department of Social Welfare, Chung-Ang University
▼ An Income Replacement Rate of 43.9%, Higher Than the U.S., Germany, and Japan ▼

Yun Suk-myung, Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA); Adjunct Professor, Department of Economics, Korea University
Against: Calls have been raised to increase the National Pension’s income replacement rate in order to strengthen the function of public pensions. The argument holds that two rounds of reform have cut the income replacement rate so deeply that old-age income security has become difficult, and that the income replacement rate should therefore be raised further to strengthen the National Pension’s income-security function. Calling for the National Pension’s income-security function to be strengthened so that the pension becomes a genuine pension may sound appealing, but closer examination reveals that the argument is fraught with problems.
As of 2015, the applicable income replacement rate for our National Pension (for a median earner with forty years of contributions) is 46.5%, declining by 0.5 percentage points each year until it reaches 40% in 2028. For a proper debate to take place, it is first necessary to share the fact that the 40% figure, which has come to symbolize a “pocket-money pension,” is the income replacement rate that will apply to future generations who join the National Pension in 2028. Those who joined the National Pension from 1988 receive a rate of 70% for eleven years and 60% for the following ten years. Since the 40% rate will not apply until 2028, thirteen years from now, the National Pension income replacement rate for those in their mid-forties or older far exceeds 50%.
It is also necessary to examine whether a 40% income replacement rate, even at the mature stage of the pension system, is really so low as to amount to mere pocket money. According to the income replacement rates of major countries (for median earners) in the OECD report Pensions at a Glance 2013, the order is Korea (43.9%), Germany (42.0%), the United States (41.0%), and Japan (37.5%). This shows that Korea’s National Pension income replacement rate is by no means low. The same holds when the pension amounts received are compared. While the average monthly Social Security benefit in the United States is 1.45 million won (USD 1,261 a month), the average monthly pension of our National Pension contributors with twenty or more years of contributions reaches about 1 million won. Taking into account the difference in income levels between the two countries, our National Pension benefit is by no means small. The reason the National Pension’s income replacement rate nonetheless feels low is that the scheme’s short history creates a wide gap between actual contribution periods and the income replacement rate. Because the scheme has existed for only a short time, the period over which people can actually contribute is short.
It is not appropriate to compare, on an equal footing, countries whose pension systems have a history of at least seventy years with Korea, which is still taking its first steps. Germany, which ran the most genuinely pension-like system, lowered its income replacement rate from 70% in the past to the low 40s because it judged that the high-benefit system of the past could hardly survive in a changing environment. The core of the 2004 pension reforms in Germany and Japan was to secure the system’s sustainability amid expected low fertility, population aging, and low growth by first setting an adequate contribution level, rather than an adequate income replacement rate, and then fitting the income replacement rate to it. Having set the contribution ceiling in the low 20s percent and then searched for the income replacement rate that was feasible, they ended up at 40%.
The OECD has noted that raising the National Pension income replacement rate to 50% would require raising contributions to 16.7% (Economic Surveys: Korea, p. 123). A high income replacement rate and a heavy contribution burden are two sides of the same coin. Raising the income replacement rate requires bearing more of the burden, yet in the 2007 reform we chose an income replacement rate of 40% on the judgment that a large contribution increase would be difficult. For us, who scrapped even a reform plan to raise contributions by just 3.9 percentage points, to 12.9% by 2018, on the grounds that it would burden the public, to now propose raising the income replacement rate to 50% is to say that we will enjoy the rights but not bear the responsibility.
What will make the pension a genuine pension is less the low income replacement rate than minimizing social exclusion by narrowing the extensive coverage gaps, and sharing welfare resources through adequate contributions and adequate benefits. Adjusting the income replacement rates, which differ widely from one pension scheme to another, and using the resources to narrow the coverage gaps of people left without public pension benefits seems, if anything, the way to make the pension a genuine pension. If we shift from the old paradigm of one pension per household to the paradigm of one pension per person, even a 40% income replacement rate is a bearable level. The true path to strengthening public pensions will be securing political sustainability that keeps fiscal soundness and intergenerational conflict to a minimum. Efforts to prepare additionally for an old age lengthened by rising life expectancy, that is, additional retirement preparation through individuals’ own efforts with government support, and gradual retirement that makes active use of partial work and partial pensions, should also be encouraged.
Yun Suk-myung, Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA); Adjunct Professor, Department of Economics, Korea University
Compiled by the Opinion Team
