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Pension Future Forum

(Seoul Economic Daily) [What Do You Think? Yun Suk-myung vs. Lee Chung-jae] Government Employees Pension Reform (2014-09-25)

2026.11.15

Government Employees Pension Reform

Yun Suk-myung, Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, and Adjunct Professor of Economics, Korea University

Yun Suk-myung, Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, and

Adjunct Professor of Economics, Korea University

Lee Chung-jae, Chairman of the Korean Government Employees’ Union

Lee Chung-jae, Chairman of the Korean Government Employees’ Union

The Korean Pension Association has put forward a reform plan to operate on the Government Employees Pension, which runs a deficit of 2 trillion won a year. It is a plan to pay more and receive less. Inside and outside the civil service, the reaction is that the plan is more shocking than expected. The public hearing scheduled for the 22nd could not even be held because of obstruction by the government employees’ union. The government and the political sphere appear set to wrap the matter up in the second half of the year in view of the political calendar ahead. The supporting side says that even a tax increase of 200 billion won a year causes great turmoil, so a deficit ten times that size cannot be left as it is, and that with population aging bold surgery is unavoidable. The government employees’ union, on the other hand, is pushing back, arguing that the pension is in the nature of compensation for the various disadvantages borne as civil servants and that the share of fiscal support is very low compared with advanced countries. We publish the arguments for and against the Korean Pension Association’s reform plan.

● For—Yun Suk-myung, Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, and Adjunct Professor of Economics, Korea University: An actual cut of 15–17% is “the minimum reform”; the government plan also needs supplementing, including consideration for lower-grade civil servants In 1960, when the Government Employees Pension was introduced, Korea’s average life expectancy was 52. The sixtieth-birthday banquet is a living fossil that recalls the days when lives were short. That is because average life expectancy has risen by 29 years, to 81. As a result, the period over which pensions are received has lengthened as well. Meanwhile, because of ultra-low fertility lasting 20 years, the future economically active population that must support pension recipients is 8 million smaller than it would normally be. With the number of elderly people who will receive pensions growing while the economically active population that must support them shrinks, extraordinary measures are needed. As population aging and the maturing of the pension system cause the number of Government Employees Pension beneficiaries to surge, the pension deficit is also snowballing. The deficit subsidy, estimated at 2.5 trillion won this year, will grow to 7.4 trillion won in 2021, seven years from now. The cumulative deficit expected over the next 10 years is 53 trillion won. The annual deficit will surge to 14.4 trillion won in 2030, 16 years from now, and to 19.5 trillion won in 2040, 26 years from now. In 2040, people aged 65 and over will approach 38% of the total population. An economically active population smaller than in the past will have to support a vastly larger number of elderly people, so the burden will be heavy enough to break its back. It is the very “back breaker,” as the popular expression goes. As the Government Employees Pension enters its mature stage, this aging shock is becoming visible. It has become evidence of the impact that aging has on the nation. With the elderly population surging, Government Employees Pension reform has become a touchstone for building a sustainable society. All the more so because it will serve as a rudder for overhauling other social security systems. The core of the government’s Government Employees Pension reform plan is to pay more and receive less than now. Members would bear 43% more, while what they receive would be cut by 34%. Because the retirement allowance would be raised to private-sector levels in exchange for the pension cut, the actual cut rate is only 15–17%. Reform of this degree seems to be the minimum reform needed to survive in a super-aged society. The core of the government reform plan is similar to the reform plan of the Pension Development Committee, made up of experts, in 2007. Since the reform plan of seven years ago was never put into practice, the Government Employees Pension must have grown even sicker in the meantime. The government reform plan also appears to need supplementing. That is because, generous though the Government Employees Pension is said to be, the plan does not take into account the reality that the gap in pension amounts between senior and junior civil servants is as large as the gap between the Government Employees Pension and the National Pension. If the same reform measures are applied to lower-grade civil servants whose low incomes mean low pensions, their life in old age could become insecure. The reality that the starting salary of a Grade 9 civil servant is 1.5 million won, even though the average civil servant’s monthly pay is 4.47 million won, bears this out. Considering that the income of a one-person urban worker household is 2 million won a month, the monthly pay of lower-grade civil servants is excessively meager. Since differences in monthly pay lead to differences in pension amounts, improvements to the pay structure and to the method of calculating pensions are unavoidable. I propose saving resources by lowering the income ceiling for pension purposes (8.05 million won a month) or setting a cap on pension payments, and using them to increase the pension amounts of lower-grade civil servants. The excessively large differences in pension amounts by date of appointment also seem to need fixing. Unless the pension vested interests of those appointed before 2010, who make up the overwhelming majority of all members, are addressed, the effect of reform may not become visible for a whole generation (30 years). A road map for introducing an automatic adjustment mechanism, which major advanced countries have adopted to cope with population aging, also appears necessary.

● Against—Lee Chung-jae, Chairman of the Korean Government Employees’ Union: Pay is 77% of the private sector, with no employment or industrial accident insurance either; the deterioration of pension finances is the fault of the government’s lax management From the time it was introduced, the Government Employees Pension was designed not as simple old-age security but as a personnel-policy instrument that included deferred wages for low pay while in service, a low retirement allowance, and compensation through the pension for various disadvantages. At present, the pay of general civil servants is only 77.6% of that at private companies with 100 or more employees, and the severance pay (retirement allowance) is at most 39%. The starting annual salary of a Grade 9 civil servant, appointed after studying for several years after university graduation, is less than 19 million won. In addition, while in service civil servants are barred from for-profit activities and from holding other jobs, they have no employment insurance or industrial accident insurance, and their basic labor rights and basic political rights are restricted. Civil servants cannot even receive the Basic Pension. Their pension is also halved in the event of disciplinary action or criminal punishment. It was successive governments that promised to compensate civil servants with a pension after retirement for the disadvantages they bore while in service. Trusting the government’s promise and accepting those disadvantages, civil servants risked their lives in floods, forest fires, foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks, and the like. The Park Geun-hye administration now intends to unilaterally break its promise to one million civil servants, 360,000 beneficiaries, and five million family members. Responsibility for the deterioration of Government Employees Pension finances lies entirely with the government. During the 1997 foreign exchange crisis, when the government carried out the restructuring of 110,000 people, it inflicted fiscal losses worth more than 24 trillion won in present value, including 4.7169 trillion won in retirement allowances, 222.7 billion won in retirement allowances from converting the Korean National Railroad into a public corporation, 1.4425 trillion won in death benefits and disaster relief payments, 586.3 billion won in unpaid retroactive contributions for military service, 470 billion won the government borrowed from the Government Employees Pension without paying a single won of interest, and 7.2 trillion won in unfunded liability reserves. Naturally, this is money the government must repay. The government is also neglecting its share of the pension’s fiscal burden. Even compared with foreign governments, the Korean government’s share of the burden for Government Employees Pension finances is absurdly low. Compared with 27.7% in Japan, 35.1% in the United States, 56.7% in Germany, and 62.1% in France, the Korean government puts a mere 12.6% into Government Employees Pension finances. Already, following the 2010 Government Employees Pension reform, the effective post-retirement income replacement rate, combining the Government Employees Pension (39.9%) and severance pay (5.85%), is only 45.75%. In the private sector, by contrast, combining the Basic Pension (7–14%) that civil servants do not receive with the National Pension (24.7%) and severance pay (14.6%) yields a post-retirement income replacement rate of 46.3% to 53.3%, higher than that of civil servants. Korea’s elderly poverty rate and suicide rate rank first in the world by an overwhelming margin. That is because the National Pension was turned into a “pocket-money” pension and the Basic Pension degraded into a pension that might as well not exist, and the public’s old age has collapsed. As in countries around the world, the public’s old age must be protected by public pensions. Yet the government instead carried out a deterioration that lowered the National Pension income replacement rate to 40%. It is, quite literally, a backward policy that abandons the state’s responsibility for the public’s old age. This is also why one million civil servants and five million family members oppose the deterioration of public pensions—to protect the public’s old age. The ruling party, the government, and the presidential office must redesign the Basic Pension and level up the National Pension. The government employees’ union will devote all its efforts to ensuring that the state guarantees the public’s old age.

ⓒ Seoul Economic Daily. Unauthorized reproduction, redistribution, and AI training or use prohibited.

https://m.sedaily.com/amparticle/11210173

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