(Korea Policy Briefing) An 8 Billion Won “Snowballing Deficit” Every Day — The Government Employees Pension Reform Bill Must Be Passed Urgently. (May 19, 2015)
By Yun Suk-myung
(Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA),
Adjunct Professor of Economics at Korea University
The Government Employees Pension reform bill, drawn up after four months of discussion, has failed to pass.
This Government Employees Pension reform plan carries special significance in that it was agreed through the National Grand Compromise Body and the National Assembly’s special committee on pensions, among others. But things began to go wrong when the agreement came to include raising the National Pension’s income replacement rate (the ratio of the monthly pension paid to the monthly pay received during one’s working years) to 50%. The aim was to reform the Government Employees Pension, whose financial instability is severe, yet the conclusion reached was to level public pension income replacement rates toward the middle by raising the National Pension’s—that is, to raise the National Pension’s income replacement rate further and cut the Government Employees Pension’s less, aligning the overall public pension income replacement rate at a middle level.
Apart from the problem of tacking on the National Pension, another problem is that the Government Employees Pension reform is far too weak. Under the agreement, the contribution burden rises by 28% from the current level (7 → 9%) and the pension received falls by 10% (1.9 → 1.7%). Because contributions are raised over five years while the pension received is reduced over 20 years, the reform became even weaker.
Another problem is that by delaying the increase in the pension eligibility age until after the early 2020s, civil servants in their mid-40s and older, the main beneficiaries, continue to enjoy the benefit of receiving pensions early. The burden-sharing by pension recipients that the Saenuri Party’s original reform plan had pursued was also entirely dropped, apart from a five-year freeze on pension amounts. Because the reform is weak and even then proceeds over 20 years, fierce criticism is being raised that it has shifted the problem of financial instability onto junior civil servants and the public.
A weakened pension reform… financial instability shifted onto junior civil servants
The argument for “leveling public pensions toward the middle,” which became the stumbling block to the agreement’s passage in the National Assembly, may seem reasonable at first glance, but a careful look shows that it is deeply problematic. Recalling that the average income replacement rate of public pensions in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is 40.6%, the argument that the National Pension’s income replacement rate is low is unconvincing. As of 2015, Korea’s National Pension income replacement rate is 46.5%, and it falls to 40% only in 2028, 13 years from now.
The reason our National Pension income replacement rate appears low is that the scheme’s history is short, so the period over which people can actually contribute is short. It is also a problem arising from the low average earnings of National Pension members (around 2 million won a month) and the low ceiling on covered earnings (4.2 million won a month). It is also a problem that stems largely from features peculiar to Korea that other OECD member countries hardly worry about: the high share of the self-employed and their tendency to under-report income, and the difficulty, in our reality, of accurately identifying the income of self-employed people who report less than they actually earn.
Unlike in other OECD member countries, the serious problem facing our National Pension is that a large share of vulnerable groups are left out of it. Vulnerable low-income people who have no means to prepare for old age are unable to join the National Pension. In this situation, raising the National Pension’s income replacement rate is more likely to drive these vulnerable groups out of the National Pension. Even now they do not join because of the contribution burden; if the income replacement rate is raised and contributions rise further, paying contributions will become even harder. Raising the income replacement rate is likely not to strengthen public pensions but only to deepen the polarization of old-age income in public pensions, which are run mainly for those in stable jobs.
When one attempts something, the result is often the exact opposite of what was originally intended. The debate on strengthening public pensions is likely to turn out the same way. Adjusting the National Pension’s income replacement rate is thus not a matter to be decided simply. It could instead only complicate matters. That is why we should focus on the Government Employees Pension reform originally pursued.
In terms of the income replacement rate, the National Pension does not differ much from how schemes are run in other countries. The Government Employees Pension, by contrast, pays more than in Germany and Japan, whose national competitiveness is higher than ours. The main cause of the Government Employees Pension’s financial instability is that, although it was introduced well before the National Pension, it has failed to undergo reform consistent with international standards. This is why the President’s call not to link the National Pension and the Government Employees Pension, and to deal with Government Employees Pension reform first, sounds persuasive.
Complementary measures to minimize conflict are needed to win public support
The Government Employees Pension’s daily deficit currently stands at about 8 billion won. Left as it is, the daily deficit subsidy will grow to about 20 billion won five years from now and to 30 billion won ten years from now. It is urgent to properly fix the Government Employees Pension, which has become a source of national worry. The President’s remark that thinking about the Government Employees Pension problem alone makes her sigh must also have had this background in mind.
The Government Employees Pension reform plan produced through the social grand compromise body should be respected, but it is also a concern that the agreement falls short of the expectations of the public, who bear the burden of the Government Employees Pension.
For the hard-won agreement to gain public support, complementary measures appear necessary that accept the criticisms raised from the public’s perspective: that stronger fiscal stabilization measures are needed, and that the plan fails to distribute the pain of reform properly between senior and junior civil servants.
The Government Employees Pension reform bill should be passed as soon as possible, after preparing complementary measures that meet the public’s expectations while minimizing the sources of conflict between long-serving and young civil servants. The direction of the National Pension’s development can be discussed after that.
[Weekly Gonggam]
[Source] Korea Policy Briefing (www.korea.kr)
https://m.korea.kr/news/cultureColumnView.do?newsId=148795441#cultureColumn
