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Pension Future Forum

(Pension Future Forum Statement) — The National Pension Fund Management Committee Must Disclose the Grounds for Its Decision to Defer Rebalancing —

2026.10.28

Statement

Disclose the Conclusion and Seal Away the Grounds?

— The National Pension Fund Management Committee must disclose the grounds for its decision to defer rebalancing —

 The National Pension Fund is the public’s retirement savings. The National Pension itself announced that its fund reserves had reached 1,865.6 trillion won at the end of June 2026. A month later, however, at the end of July, the reserves had fallen to 1,684.2 trillion won. They decreased by 181.4 trillion won in just one month. This alone does not establish a causal link with the deferral of rebalancing. But precisely because markets can change this abruptly, the principles of strategic asset allocation and rebalancing must be observed all the more strictly. If the investment principles themselves begin to be changed after the fact to follow market conditions, strategic asset allocation can hardly function as a discipline any longer.

 The Pension Future Forum has repeatedly argued that domestic stock rebalancing must be carried out in accordance with the established principles. Of course, it is not the case that the rebalancing principles can never be changed under any circumstances. But they must not be easily changed or deferred at discretion according to market conditions or policy needs. Rebalancing is not an expedient for following the market but a discipline designed to uphold long-term asset allocation principles despite market fluctuations. Changing or deferring those principles as an exception must therefore require far stricter grounds and procedures than ordinary investment decisions, and that judgment must be put on record and verified after the fact.

 Nevertheless, in 2026 the National Pension Fund Management Committee raised the target allocation for domestic stocks in succession and deferred rebalancing. We do not presume in advance that the decision was wrong.

 But if the principles were changed, why they were changed must be explained.

The government and the National Pension cite exposure of investment strategy and effects on financial markets as reasons why the relevant minutes are difficult to disclose. Yet they have already disclosed, on their own, the fact that rebalancing is being deferred, when the deferral will end, and the fact that the target allocation for domestic stocks is being changed.

 The conclusions that could affect the market have already been disclosed.

What they are not disclosing, however, is why that decision was made, what risks and alternatives were examined, and whether there were sufficient grounds to change the existing investment principles.

 Are they saying the conclusion may be disclosed but its grounds are investment secrets?

This does not add up. Moreover, the provision on nondisclosure of minutes under the National Pension Act must not be used as grounds for evading accountability. The Act allows public disclosure of the minutes to be delayed in certain cases, but the same Act requires the minutes to be submitted on a confidential basis when the competent standing committee of the National Assembly requests them.

 The intent of the law is to protect information that must not be disclosed to the market while not going so far as to block scrutiny of the decision itself. The logic that nondisclosure is permissible merely because the law contains an exception for nondisclosure is therefore unacceptable.

 Four years of nondisclosure is not four years of immunity.

And a more important question remains.

 If this judgment later proves to have been a wrong decision, who will be held responsible?

The Fund Management Committee? The Ministry of Health and Welfare? The National Pension Service? Or will no one take responsibility in the end, leaving the insured and future generations to bear the consequences?

 It must not be a structure in which the fund’s investment performance is actively publicized when results are good, but those accountable vanish when results turn bad. Only when the record shows who made what judgment, what risks were raised, and what alternatives were examined can the rationality of the decision be assessed after the fact and responsibility be determined.

 One cannot speak of accountability while withholding the record.

 The Pension Future Forum therefore demands the following.

First, the National Assembly Health and Welfare Committee must, under the authority granted by the National Pension Act, obtain the minutes of the Fund Management Committee concerning the deferral of rebalancing and the change in the target allocation for domestic stocks, and scrutinize them immediately.

Second, the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the National Pension Fund Management Committee must, while protecting information that could affect the market, such as specific trading strategies, disclose the grounds for the judgments on deferring rebalancing and changing the target allocation, the risk assessment, the alternatives examined, and the main points of discussion.

Third, institutionalize a requirement that, whenever the principles of strategic asset allocation and rebalancing are changed or deferred, the reasons and the results of the review of alternatives be recorded and disclosed after the fact, and make clear who holds the authority and the responsibility for major investment decisions.

The law exists to guarantee the public’s right to know; it is not a shield for evading accountability for public decisions. If the rules were changed, state the reasons, and make clear who is accountable for the decision.

October 29, 2026

Pension Future Forum

※ Fund reserve figures are based on the official disclosures of the National Pension Fund Management Headquarters.

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