(Dong-A Ilbo Contributed Article on the Dysfunctional Operation of the Public Deliberation Committee) Proper Information Must Be Provided to the Citizen Representatives of the Pension Public Deliberation Committee [Contributed Article / Yun Suk-myung] (April 16, 2024)
![(Dong-A Ilbo Contributed Article on the Dysfunctional Operation of the Public Deliberation Committee) Proper Information Must Be Provided to the Citizen Representatives of the Pension Public Deliberation Committee [Contributed Article / Yun Suk-myung] (April 16, 2024)](/uploads/editor/2026/09/d3ffc36b8bc74ce294e5171d51492fa0-1788676691795.jpg)
(The Pension Future Forum
extends its deep gratitude to those at the Dong-A Ilbo
who, despite considerable difficulties,
decided to publish
this contributed article.)
Amid great public interest, the Public Deliberation Committee under the National Assembly Special Committee on Pension Reform was launched.
On the 13th it began debate sessions involving 500 citizen representatives.
The premise—that the citizen representatives would decide pension reform—sounded plausible enough.
But in truth it was the government and the National Assembly standing aside and offloading their responsibility.
The assurance by the minister of the responsible ministry that a proper parametric reform plan (an adjustment of the income replacement rate and the contribution rate) would be put forward proved to be a promise not worth the paper it was written on.
What is more, the advisory committee of the National Assembly Special Committee on Pension Reform nullified the fiscal stabilization measure that had overwhelming support among experts.
The option preferred by 10 of the 15 advisory committee members
(keeping the income replacement rate at 40% as under current law and raising the contribution rate to 15%; at present the income replacement rate is 42% and the contribution rate 9%) was nullified, and as a result
the citizen representatives do not know why the experts preferred it.
Even though a vote had determined the majority option (a 40% income replacement rate with a 15% contribution rate), the National Pension Financial Estimation Committee published its final report without marking it as the majority option.
The cumulative deficit ratio relative to gross domestic product (GDP) through the end of the financial projection period (2093) was recorded using a fund investment return rate that departed from what the committee had agreed.
Had it been discounted using the government bond interest rate, as originally agreed, the cumulative deficit ratio would roughly double.
That what had been agreed was changed without the members' consent is no small matter.
Even this figure was left out of the Comprehensive National Pension Management Plan submitted to the National Assembly.
The operation of the Public Deliberation Committee is likewise difficult to comprehend.
The Committee nullified the fiscal stabilization measure that most experts preferred, and then built its advisory group around members who want to push the income replacement rate, that is, ‘the money received,’ still higher.
The Public Deliberation Committee is, in effect, already a ‘tilted playing field.’
A total of 36 interest groups settled on the two fiscal stabilization agenda items the citizen representatives are to debate.
Option 1 is a 50% income replacement rate with the contribution rate raised to 13%; Option 2 is a 40% income replacement rate with the contribution rate raised to 12%.
Of the two, Option 1 adds 702 trillion won to the deficit through 2093.
Option 2, by contrast, reduces the deficit by 1,970 trillion won through 2093.
Option 2 is weaker than the existing fiscal stabilization measures, but in that it reduces the deficit it can at least be called a reform plan.
The citizen representatives must know that the two options differ by 2,700 trillion won in the scale of the burden they shift onto future generations.
Yet the citizen representatives who are to decide pension reform are studying from materials that leave out the key information.
Key fiscal indicators that the Ministry of Health and Welfare submitted to the Public Deliberation Committee were excluded from the study materials owing to protests from the advisory group, which champions strengthening income security.
This is unconscionable.
The problem is grave.
Because the citizen representatives are learning from materials that omit the long-term effects of each alternative, they are highly likely to make the wrong decision.
That is why the risk of pension populism running rampant looks so high.
The British public deliberation body that our Public Deliberation Committee takes as its role model provided the key information, and in the citizens' second vote it produced a proper direction for reform.
We have a comparable case of our own.
In an EBS TV special on low birth rates, the vote was reversed once 500 citizens were given proper information. Preference for painful reform rose.
As things stand, the Public Deliberation Committee is deceiving the public and the press in the name of public deliberation.
Proper information must reach the citizen representatives as soon as possible.
